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ARGUMENT 
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN AN UNDUE INFLUENCE WILL CONTEST 
IS A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, 
A. Buttar's Estate Stands for the Proposition that 
the Burden of Persuasion in an Undue Influence Will Contest 
is a Preponderance of the Evidence, 
Ms. Birch asserts "that a careful reading of [In Re 
Buttarsf Estate1 discloses that the Court is there talking 
about the burden of going forward and is not addressing the 
ultimate issue of "Burden of persuasion11. Appellant's Reply 
Brief at 9-10. This is plainly wrong. The burden of going 
forward has nothing to do with concepts like clear and 
convincing evidence and preponderance of the evidence; those 
terms can only apply to the ultimate burden of persuasion. 
Thus, where the Supreme Court in Buttarsf Estate states that 
the contestant must prove "by a preponderance of evidence" 
that the testatrix "was acting under . . . undue influence," 
the Court is addressing the same issue Mr. McCullough is 
raising on this cross appeal: What is the burden of 
persuasion when a will contestant alleges undue influence? 
The Supreme Court stated that the burden is a preponderance 
of the evidence. In Re Buttars1 Estate. 261 P.2d 171, 172 
(Utah 1953). Thus, Mr. McCullough asks the Court of Appeals 
to reverse Judge Daniels1 ruling on this point. 
1 
B. Courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, Use the 
Word "Substantial" when referring to Cases involving Clear 
and Convincing Evidence and Preponderance of the Evidence, 
Four Utah Supreme Court decisions state that there must 
be "substantial" proof of undue influence in order to 
sustain a verdict denying probate to a will on that basis. 
In Re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1952); see 
also In Re Bryanfs Estate, 25 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1933); In 
Re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1938); In 
Re George's Estate, 112 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1941). 
Throughout her Reply Brief, Ms. Birch argues directly and 
implicitly that the Supreme Court's use of the word 
"substantial" is equivalent to requiring clear and 
convincing evidence. Ms. Birch's own authorities dispute 
this. 
For instance, Ms. Birch cites C.J.S. for the following 
proposition: 
According to some authorities, a 
preponderance of the evidence is necessary 
and sufficient to establish undue influence 
in the execution of a will. However, in 
numerous cases, it has been said that undue 
influence, invalidating a will, must be 
established by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence, by compelling evidence, 
or by the manifest weight of the evidence. 
In any event, undue influence in the 
execution of a will must be shown by 
substantial evidence and evidence which 
merely raises a suspicion or conjecture that 
2 
the will was the product of undue influence 
is insufficient. 
Appellant's Reply Brief at 14. 94 C.J.S. Wills §251 (1956) 
(emphasis added; citations omitted). What this citation 
shows is that "substantial" evidence is required regardless 
of whether the burden of proof is clear and convincing 
evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Likewise, Ms. Birch cites the New Mexico Supreme Court 
case of Lumpkins v. McPhee for the proposition that evidence 
is not substantial unless it is "clear, strong and 
convincing." Appellant's Reply Brief at 11; Lumpkins v. 
McPhee. 286 P.2d 299, 306 (N.M. 1955). However, the 
paragraph proceeding Ms. Birch's citation refutes her 
argument. 
Ordinarily, the evidence is deemed 
substantial if it tips the scales in favor of 
the party on whom rests the burden of proof, 
even though it barely tips them. He is then 
said to have established his case by a 
preponderance of the evidence. A finding in 
his favor on the decisive issue is thus said 
to be supported by substantial evidence. 
Lumpkins, 286 P.2d at 306. What this case shows is that the 
concept of substantial evidence is equally important in 
cases where the burden is a preponderance of the evidence as 
it is in cases where the burden is clear and convincing 
evidence. Utah likewise recognizes that substantial 
3 
evidence can be required in cases requiring a preponderance 
of the evidence. Rowe v. Rowe, 365 P.2d 797, 797 (Utah 
1961) ("In line with our oft-expressed determination that on 
appeal the conclusions of the trial court in a case like 
this will remain inviolate if supported by a preponderance 
of competent, substantial and believable evidence . . . . " ) ; 
Piute Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. West Panauitch I.& R. Co., 3 64 
P.2d 113, 116 (Utah 1961) ("[The applicant] must support a 
decision in its favor on this question by substantial 
evidence, and it has the burden of convincing the trier of 
the facts by a preponderance of all of the evidence . . 
. . " ) . Thus, the Court should reject Ms. Birch's efforts to 
equate "substantial" proof with clear and convincing 
evidence. 
C. Deed Cases Show that the Burden in Undue Influence 
Will Cases should be a Preponderance of the Evidence. 
Mr. McCullough agrees with Ms. Birch that an action 
challenging the validity of a deed on the grounds of undue 
influence must be proven on the basis of clear and 
convincing evidence. Appellant's Reply Brief at 12. From 
this, Ms. Birch argues that the same result should apply in 
will contests. However, this does not follow. 
4 
Any attack on a deed, including an attack based on the 
alleged incomptency of the grantor, requires a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence. Richmond v. Ballard, 325 
P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1958). A will contestant's burden of 
proof on allegations that the testator was incompetent is a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Estate of Kesler, 
702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985). Thus, deed contests and will 
contests cannot be construed in pari materia. 
Moreover, while a deed is generally effective upon 
delivery, a will is generally not effective until admitted 
to probate. Compare Kresser v. Peterson, 675 P.2d 1193, 
1994 (Utah 1984) with U.C.A. §75-3-101 et sea. (1978). 
Thus, to protect innocent third parties, deeds need a strong 
presumption of validity. On the other hand, since a will is 
not admissable to probate until after its validity is 
determined, there is no similar need for a strong 
presumption of validity. 
In addition, many times the grantor of the deed is 
available to testify; the testator, by contrast, is never 
available. As a result, in undue influence will contests, 
the contestant will be left with circumstantial evidence. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has observed: 
In a case of this sort, it is not usually 
possible to procure direct evidence of 
5 
statements and conduct which one accused of 
undue influence has used on the decedent• 
One of the two is dead; the other cannot be 
expected to give evidence against himself. 
The ususal way is to give the surrounding 
circumstances from which deductions may be 
made. 
In Re Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Utah 1935). To 
leave the contestant to circumstantial evidence and require 
proof by clear and convincing evidence puts an enormous and 
unfair burden on contestants and makes Utah's aging 
population vulnerable to the unscrupulous. Accordingly, 
while any attack on a deed requires clear and convincing 
evidence, claims of undue influence in will contests should 
be based on a preponderance of the evidence. 
D. The Burden of Proof does not Vary Depending on the 
Facts of the Case. 
Ms. Birch twice suggests that the burden of persuasion 
in undue influence will contests varies depending on the 
facts of the case. Appellant's Reply Brief at 12-13 ("the 
appropriate rule of law was applied in requiring that the 
proof of persuasion be that of clear and convincing 
evidence, taking into account the 'facts and circumstances' 
of the case at hand"), at 15 ("we respectfully submit that 
the trial judge made the correct pronouncement of law under 
the facts and circumstances involved"). This is false. The 
6 
burden of proof will be the same for all litigants who 
allege undue influence in a will contest. The determination 
of whether a particular litigant has met that burden will 
vary from case to case depending on the evidence adduced. 
That is the only aspect that varies; the law remains 
constant. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, if the Court of Appeals does not affirm 
Judge Daniels' decision on the basis of his ruling on the 
competency issue, Mr. McCullough requests that the Court 
affirm the result by reversing Judge Daniels' decision on 
the standard of proof required when a will contestant 
alleges undue influence. 
Dated September 11, 1992. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
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